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Introduction: The Kishu An, the Forest of Literature, and their 
Constituencies of Loss  
At the end of winding Tong-an Street in Taipei, Taiwan, next to an elevated 
highway that runs along a dike protecting the city from the floodprone Xindian River, lies 
a grove of banyan trees which shade a large metal frame shed.  The shed protects the 
ruins of an old three-story building made of concrete and wood, which can only be 
glimpsed through slats in the high stockade fence that surrounds it (fig. 1).  This 
dilapidated structure, built in the 1920s with a few small post-World War II additions, 
was originally Kishu An (紀州庵), a nightclub built during the Japanese occupation of 
Taiwan.  From the early 1920s to World War II, Kishu An was operated as a branch 
location of a downtown Taipei restaurant run by the Hiramatsu family, who came to 
Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation in order to take advantage of the 
commercial opportunities made possible by Japan’s colonial expansion.  The restaurant 
and nightclub served expatriate Japanese government workers and businessmen, offering 
reminders of home—freshly prepared fish, geisha entertainers, and a traditional Japanese 
garden.  Kishu An also operated excursion boats on the Xindian River, on which guests 
could drink, dine and even try their hand at fishing.  
Today, the tall riverside dike next to the Shuiyuan Expressway is an imposing 
barrier to waterfront access from Kishu An, and there is little sense of being close to the 
water.  But in the 1920s, the dike was lower than it is today, and also closer to the 
building, and the highway did not yet exist.  At that time, the second story of Kishu An 
 2 
was level with the top of the dike, and three pedestrian bridges allowed guests to walk out 
onto the dike from the building and enjoy the view of the river, its floodplain and the 
distant mountains.  They could also watch horse races on a track that was built below the 
dike.  On the opposite side of the building, guests could walk through a long, narrow 
pavilion and enjoy views of a garden featuring pine trees, azaleas, and camellias 
surrounding a small pond.1 
Like all Japanese-owned buildings in Taipei, Kishu An was expropriated by the 
Chinese Guomindang government after Japan was defeated in World War II and 
renounced its claim on Taiwan.  The building became a dormitory housing the families of 
workers in two government bureaus, and at least two small additions were constructed 
adjacent to it. The famous Taiwanese author Wenxing Wang spent his childhood there in 
the 1950s; his 1972 book Family Catastrophe, which shocked Taiwanese with its graphic 
depictions of dysfunctional family life, was based in part on his experiences living in 
Kishu An.  Families of government workers and pensioners continued to reside in Kishu 
An through the early 2000s even as the building gradually deteriorated and parts of it 
were lost in fires.2    
In 2003, a group of undergraduate students conducting a survey of the 
neighborhood discovered Kishu An and learned that the city was planning to demolish it 
to make way for a municipal parking lot.  Several of the students joined together with 
neighborhood residents, who wanted to save the tall banyan trees that had grown up in 
what was once the restaurant’s garden, to form a new organization, the Taipei Chengnan 
                                                
1 Yu-qun Lin, “Zai Shuo Yi Ci, Jizhou-an De Gushi (再說一次，紀州庵的故事),” 文訊 
(Wenhsun) (September 2011): 60–66. 
2 John K. C. Liu, National Taiwan University, interview by author, July 26, 2012. 
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Riverbank Cultural Society3, devoted to saving the structure and finding a new use for it.  
This organization enlisted the help of Wang Wenxing and other authors who had lived or 
worked in the area and planned a new cultural center on the site, to be called the Kishu 
An Forest of Literature4, that would promote Taipei’s literary heritage, drawing upon 
postwar memories of writers who lived in the area and the many small publishing houses 
that sprang up in the surrounding neighborhood from the 1950s to the 1970s.  In 2011, 
city government funding was secured for the construction of a new building adjacent to 
Kishu An to house the literary center, but fundraising had not yet been completed for the 
restoration of Kishu An itself.  The new building houses a teahouse, exhibits about the 
Kishu An structure and its history, and exhibits and lectures relating to Taiwan’s literary 
heritage.  The grounds are used for a variety of community festivals. 
The restoration and redevelopment of the Kishu An site can be viewed as 
exemplifying Jeremy E. Taylor’s findings that a new approach to Taiwanese history that 
emerged in the 1990s, which acknowledges the benefits of or even whitewashes the 
Japanese occupation period and no longer places China at the center of Taiwanese history, 
has led to a reevaluation of the meaning and significance of Japanese sites throughout 
Taiwan.5  Taylor identifies three major aspects of the new attitude toward Japanese 
                                                
3 This is my translation of 台北城南水岸文化協會.  “Chengnan” (城南), literally “City 
Wall South,” is an informal name that is sometimes used to refer to the part of Taipei in 
which Kishu An is located. 
4 Kishu An Forest of Literature is the official English name and a close translation of 紀
州庵文學森林, the Chinese name of the new cultural center. The first part of this name, 
Kishu An (紀州庵) is a Japanese proper noun referring to the name of the building; the 
second part of the name, 文學森林, is Chinese and translated into English as “Literature 
Forest” or “Forest of Literature.” 
5 Jeremy E. Taylor, “Reading History Through the Built Environment in Taiwan,” in 
Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua, ed. John 
Makeham and A-Chin Hsiao (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
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heritage sites: all of these are present in Kishu An.  First, Taylor identifies a preference 
for remembering the past through preservation of physical objects; this is undoubtedly the 
case with Kishu An Forest of Literature, as the architectural object of the Japanese Kishu 
An, although not yet renovated, is being actively preserved and has been taken by the 
new cultural center as its primary identity.  Second, Taylor notes that the preference for 
saving these structures occurs at the level of the local community, rather than the national 
government.  In the Kishu An case, there was local action by students who performed the 
background research necessary to identify the significance of the site, while the 
neighborhood was spurred to action by the city government’s proposal to turn the site 
into a parking lot.  Taipei City ultimately provided funding for the preservation of the site 
and the construction of the new building through its cultural affairs bureau.   Third, 
according to Taylor, the trend toward preserving such architecture is connected to the 
broader trend of “Japanophilia” (ha ri, 哈日) on which Kishu An subtly relies to attract 
consumers and exhibition-goers.   
Using Taylor’s analysis as a jumping-off point, I have identified three 
constituencies, which can be conceived as forming a series of three concentric rings, who 
are served by the adaptive reuse of Kishuan as a historic site and cultural center (see 
figure 2).  Those who are closest to the fight to preserve and adaptively reuse the site—
those who documented the original building’s history, fought against its demolition, and 
formed and continue to participate in the Chengnan Riverbank Cultural Society—about 
40 people in total—form the innermost constituency.6  The second-ring constituency 
consists of civic activists and neighborhood residents who may participate only 
                                                
6 Yu-qun lin, Taibei Chengnan Shui-an Wenhua Xiehui, e-mail communication to author, 
August 12, 2012. 
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peripherally in the cultural activities of the site, and may or may not have strong feelings 
about the site’s history, but still supported its preservation out of concern about saving 
the banyan trees and the potential negative impact on the quality of life of the 
neighborhood if the property were redeveloped. Besides self-interested neighborhood 
residents, this group also includes citywide activists who see the preservation of 
individual sites such as Kishu An as battles in a broader war to maintain the aesthetic 
values of green space, trees and low-scaled buildings throughout Taipei.  The third 
constituency consists of the broader public that visits, or desires to visit, Kishu An Forest 
of Literature and consume the site as a cultural experience involving Japaneseness.  Of 
course, these constituencies can and do overlap; someone concerned with neighborhood 
green space may also be a Japanophile.  But conceived separately, they help explain why 
the package of qualities that Kishu An Forest of Literature provides to all three 
constituencies—memory, culture, aesthetics, a sense of place, an experience of shared 
community—coupled with the project’s failure to stir up any significant opposition, has 
made it, in the words of planning professor John K. C. Liu, a successful adaptive reuse 
project.7  By contrast, certain other well-known historic preservation projects in Taipei, 
both completed and hoped-for among activists, have been less successful in establishing 
and maintaining these constituencies.8  
                                                
7 John K. C. Liu, National Taiwan University, interview by author. 
8 Notable among these less successful projects is Treasure Hill, in which former veterans’ 
housing dating to the post-World War II era was converted into a gentrified “artists’ 
village.”  Despite being featured as a travel destination in The New York Times, this 
project has been racked with controversy over the expulsion of many of the original 
residents and conflicts between artists, visitors, and the remaining residents.  Treasure 
Hill also did not have the advantage of being linked to the Japanese occupation, so it 
could not draw upon the “Japanophilia” craze or nostalgia for the Japanese era. 
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Although they have differing levels of interest in and consciousness of the site, 
what binds all three rings of constituencies of Kishu An Forest of Literature together are 
experienced and imagined collective losses, both historical and potential.  It is their 
divergent consciousness of these losses that separates the constituencies and reveals the 
ways in which the memories of this site, those of other actual and potential historic sites 
throughout Taipei, and the collective memory of Taiwanese identity itself are variously 
being conceived and transformed by multiple groups within Taiwanese society who are 
involved, in one way or another, with historic preservation.  De Certeau notes that a loss 
of existence, a “lacuna of history” makes it “possible and necessary” to create a collective 
story.9  I would suggest that fear of an imminent loss, or the experience of the beginnings 
of such a loss, can equally trigger such an impulse. The lacunae involved in the Kishu An 
story are several. First, there is the actual, historical loss of the Japanese occupation era, 
which the Guomindang tried to erase from the consciousness of the people through 
sinicization campaigns in the 1950s and beyond.  Second, there is the actual, historical 
loss of the era from the 1950s to the 1970s when the Kishu An was reused as housing and 
the surrounding neighborhood became a community of small publishing houses. This era 
was swept away by the liberalization of politics and the opening to the outside world that 
occurred beginning in the mid-1970s.  Third, there is the potential physical loss of the 
remains of the site—in particular, the large trees that constitute one of the neighborhood’s 
few green spaces, but which are also a stand-in for the other small, historical patches of 
green that dot such sites throughout the parts of the city where Japanese resided, and 
which are gradually succumbing to redevelopment.  On the Kishu An site itself, these 
                                                
9 Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1988), 325. 
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trees were very nearly lost for the construction of a parking lot in 2002.  And fourth, as 
economic integration with mainland China proceeds apace, there is the potential loss of 
the 1990s conception of “Taiwan”—closely identified with then-President Lee Teng-Hui, 
as a unique, mixed- and multi-ethnic polity, possibly as much Japanese as Chinese. As an 
entity that proudly flaunts both the Japanese and local aspects of Taiwan’s history, Kishu 
An Forest of Literature can be interpreted as an embodiment of the 1990s, Lee Teng-Hui 
idea of Taiwan.  At the same time, in appealing to the constituency of the broader public, 
Kishu An Forest of Literature emphasizes its connections to the Japanese era.  This can 
be seen in everything from the name of the institution itself, which stresses the Japanese 
connection by using the term “Kishu An” as the primary means by which the site is 
represented in signage (see figures 3 and 4), to the emphasis in reconstruction plans on 
harmonizing the adaptive reuse of the project with its original, Japanese appearance.  
This suggests that while the loss of the Japanese era is deeply and widely felt, the 
position of the postwar era is much more ambiguous vis-à-vis what constitutes “Taiwan” 
in the broader public mind.  On the other hand, activists’ historic understandings of the 
postwar era, and the Kishu An structure’s relation to it, clearly have major significance to 
the first-ring constituency that rallied around saving the Kishu An.  Therefore, it is not 
enough to say that the preservation of the Kishu An only relies on Japanese-era nostalgia 
and present-day Japanophilia.  Instead, the building’s significance to those who have 
worked on its preservation is shaped primarily by the postwar meanings that the site and 
the surrounding area have acquired, but these meanings have not been fully exposed in 
the redeveloped site as a symbol of Japaneseness directed for the broad public’s 
consumption. 
 8 
Repressive Pasts, Feared Futures: Excavating, Preserving and 
Protecting Nostalgia for “Taiwan” 
The constituency that has done much of the writing of this collective story in 
response to loss is the core group of residents who have formed the Chengnan Riverbank 
Cultural Society (initially called the Tong’an Forest of Culture Booster Association10), 
around what the members have taken to be the history of Kishu An, the building and site; 
its famous literary inhabitant Wang Wenxing; and the surrounding area’s publishing 
houses which flourished in the 1970s.11  In the act of bringing together and creating a 
single narrative out of an apparently disjointed collection of past time periods, people and 
institutions, they are, writing for themselves, as Taipei residents and aficionados of 
history, architecture and literature, a collective history of the Chengnan area of Taipei 
that selectively includes elements from the Japanese past, the postwar past, and even the 
already receding post-martial law time of transition. In the words of Lin Yu-qun, one of 
the founders of the movement, the historical connection between the architecture and the 
literature was “coincidental,” but they became associated through the portrayal of Kishu 
An in Wang Wenxing’s novel Family Catastrophe.12 
Although the relationship between the Japanese architecture of Kishu An and the 
Taiwan literature of the 1970s may be an accident of history in one sense, it is perhaps 
not so coincidental at all that that Kishu An Forest of Literature is conceptualized around 
nostalgia for these two highly repressive eras in the history of the island.  First, there is 
the matter of precedent: apart from the use of Kishu An itself as a backdrop in Wang 
                                                
10 This is my translation of 同安文化森林促進會. 
11 Lin, “Zai Shuo Yi Ci, Jizhou-an De Gushi.” 
12 Lin, “Zai Shuo Yi Ci, Jizhou-an De Gushi.” 
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Wenxing’s novel, there are numerous, longstanding physical connections between the old 
houses left over from the Japanese period and the postwar period of dissidence and 
opening up.  Although Kishu An itself was appropriated as a residence for civil servants 
by a government ministry, many Japanese houses, being situated in the area between 
National Taiwan University (NTU) and National Taiwan Normal University (NTNU), 
were allocated as homes of teachers and students at these universities, some of whom 
held dissident views and participated in political organization and information sharing.  
Two notable such houses are the home of dissident Yin Haiguang and the Wistaria Tea 
House (紫藤蘆).  The diminutive Yin Haiguang house was a late example of Japanese 
domestic construction, built during wartime in the 1940s of material salvaged from a 
former guardhouse at NTU.  A philosophy professor at NTU who admired such 
midcentury anti-statist figures as Bertrand Russell and Friedrich von Hayek, Yin 
Haiguang was assigned to live in the house in 1956, where he wrote articles attacking the 
government and later was placed under surveillance and restricted from lecturing or 
traveling.13 The Wistaria Tea House, only a few blocks from Yin Haiguang’s residence, 
was built as a residence during the occupation period and was the home of dissident Zhou 
De-wei, an economist, after the war.  For 20 years, dissident intellectuals frequently met 
in the house, and after it was converted in 1981 to a Japanese-style teahouse with tatami 
floors, it became something of a literary salon.14  The historical trajectories of these and 
                                                
13 “Yin Haiguang House” (Yin Haiguang Memorial Foundation, n.d.); “Tieji You Taibei: 
Xun Muwu, Fang Da Shu, Zai Xian Lao Taibei (鐵騎遊台北：尋木屋，訪大樹，再現
老台北)” (Taibei Shi Wenhua Ju (台北市文化局), May 2005). 





other Japanese homes in the NTU and NTNU vicinity have resulted in an indelible 
association of dissident intellectuals in the postwar period with Japanese architecture. 
Besides the physical connections that have long tied together Japanese rule and 
postwar resistance to the Guomindang, nostalgia for both eras of repression is also 
intimately connected to the present in psychically powerful ways.  Baudrillard, writing in 
1970s France, noted that the end of repressive regimes in Europe seemed to result in a 
particular sense of loss—what he termed the loss of referentials. In the era of relative 
peace, prosperity and freedom that followed World War II in Europe, a void that had 
previously been filled by the daily call of duty to and support for, or resistance to, an 
overweening state could be filled after the defeat of the regimes only by consumerism, 
leading, he felt, to a sense of nostalgia for fascism.15  One could, perhaps, make much the 
same claim of present-day Taiwan. The lifting of martial law in 1987 had two contrary 
effects: it triggered a cavalcade of localization movements in politics and the humanities; 
at the same time, information and ideas from previously verboten places—including, in 
particular, Japan, but also mainland China—began flooding into the island.   These post-
martial law paroxysms have given way to an apparent equilibrium in the current era: 
freedom and democracy have been used largely to further the consumption of material 
goods and experiences, consistent with the experience of other advanced industrialized 
nations.  Hence, the changes of the 1990s yielded many more objects, both local and 
global, that could be consumed, but the new era was, in Baudrillard’s words, “traversed 
by currents, but emptied of references.”  For those cast into such a void, it is natural to 
latch onto left-behind remnants of pasts when meanings were more apparent. 
                                                
15 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1994), 43–44. 
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Nostalgia for Japanese rule has its roots in the repressive era that directly 
followed it.  For the entire Cold War period, at the same time it was trying to sinicize 
Taiwan, the Republic of China government was also fighting an assiduous propaganda 
war against the government that controlled essentially all of historical China.16  In order 
to do this, the ROC government had to assert that Taiwan was a staging ground for the 
retaking of China, while at the same time it had to indoctrinate those living on Taiwan 
with anti-Communist attitudes.  These goals were summarized in the slogan “fangong 
fuguo” (oppose the Communists, recover China).17  For some Taiwanese facing 
Guomindang rule, the slogans rang hollow.  They were not allowed much of a say in 
politics, as the government froze the presidency and the national legislative assemblies in 
place, supposedly for the duration of the “civil war” in China; the Guomindang used its 
power and influence to sway local elections; and political dissidents were imprisoned.18  
By comparison to the previous Japanese administration, the Guomindang seemed to lack 
efficiency, honesty and competency, particularly in the early years when the economy 
was failing.19  Although the Taiwanese economy would later dramatically improve under 
the Guomindang, the bitter memories of postwar disappointment at liberation from the 
                                                
16 Taiwan itself was a latter-day and peripheral addition to the Chinese sphere, not having 
been settled by Chinese in significant numbers until the seventeenth century when it was 
incorporated as a frontier of the Manchu-controlled Qing empire. 
17 B.-y. Chang, “So Close, yet so Far Away: Imaging Chinese ‘Homeland’ in Taiwan’s 
Geography Education (1945--68),” Cultural Geographies 18, no. 3 (June 29, 2011): 385–
411. 
18 Peter Chen-main Wang, “A Bastion Created, a Regime Reformed, an Economy 
Reengineered, 1949-1970,” in Taiwan: A New History, ed. Murray Rubinstein (Armonk, 
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999). 
19 Steven Phillips, “Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political 
Aspirations Under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945-1948,” in Taiwan: A New History, ed. 
Murray Rubinstein (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 282. 
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Japanese would linger with the political repression that continued for several more 
decades.   
Further, while the Japanese colonial administration had also been a repressive 
regime, its status as an indelibly foreign regime gave native Taiwanese political leaders 
the space to develop a constituency of opposition.  From the beginning, the Japanese 
colonizers identified that Taiwanese were “biologically” different from Japanese, and the 
political organization of the colony was premised on this fundamental difference.20 
Taiwanese would not become Japanese, although various assimilation policies would be 
tried in the 1930s as the colony became more strategically important to Japan.  Under 
these conditions, Japan needed the cooperation of local elites who retained a Taiwanese 
identity to get things done in Taiwan, and in the 1920s and early 1930s, these so-called 
“counter-elites” took advantage of the chaotic situation in Japanese domestic politics to 
advocate for changes in the system.21  But after the war, the Guomindang would assert 
that everyone, refugee from the mainland and native Taiwanese alike, was equally 
Chinese; further, the so-called waishengren who had fled mainland China, being 
connected with the Guomindang, naturally tended to obtain positions of leadership in 
government, politics and business. Dissidents were dealt with harshly, and there was little 
acknowledgement from the Guomindang-controlled government until 1969 of the need 
                                                
20 Yun-Han Chu and Jih-Wen Lin, “Political development in 20th-century Taiwan: State-
building, regime transformation and the construction of national identity,” The China 
Quarterly no. 165 (March 2001): 102–129. 
21 Phillips, “Between Assimilation and Independence,” 278–279; Chu and Lin, “Political 
development in the 20th-century Taiwan.” 
 13 
for locals (bendiren) to play a political role.22  As a result, the kind of locally-based 
political organizing which had been occurring before the war was not much in evidence 
in the 1950s and 1960s.  Advocates of greater local political control tended to be lone 
intellectual voices rather than powerful local elites, so constituencies of resistance were 
deeply isolated.  Contrasting their treatment at the hands of the Guomindang with that at 
the hands of the Japanese, some Taiwanese developed a latent admiration for Japan; at 
least under Japanese rule, there had been possibilities of collective dissent and public 
space for a Taiwanese identity, whereas this was only possible in very constrained, 
private spaces under the early decades of Guomindang rule.  
And yet, although this nostalgia for the Japanese occupation period arose from 
repression subsequently experienced under the Guomindang, the literary component of 
Kishu An Forest of Literature memorializes the loss of this very postwar period. 
Specifically, it is concerned with preserving the memories and legacies of the publishing 
houses and journals based in the surrounding few blocks that sprung up between the 
1950s and the 1970s, attracted by the proximity of the area to both National Taiwan 
University and National Taiwan Normal University.  When I visited in summer 2012, the 
entire second floor of the new building was devoted to an exhibition concerning 15 of 
these small publishers and journals. An article that was written to accompany the 
exhibition notes that although the Taiwanese remember this time as a period when the 
Guomindang government was repressive and frightening, the history of the publishing 
houses in the area surrounding Kishu An reveals that a gradual opening of thought took 
                                                
22 Murray Rubinstein, “Political Taiwanization and Pragmatic Diplomacy in the Eras of 
Chiang Ching-Kuo and Lee Teng-Hui, 1971-1994,” in Taiwan: A New History, ed. 
Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 439. 
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place over the years, ranging from the publishing of local fiction to Sanmao’s translations 
of Spanish comics in the late 1970s.23  The exhibition reveals a a gradual opening of 
expressive possibilities, within politically allowable boundaries. For example, perhaps 
cognizant of its political position in alignment with the West, the ROC government 
allowed the publication of iconoclastic Western writers such as Sartre, Kafka, Freud and 
Woolf in the journal “Modern Literature” (現代文學), established by young writers 
associated with National Taiwan University beginning in 1960. In 1967, a journal called 
“University Magazine” (大學雜誌) was founded to publish criticism of government 
policy by young writers; by 1971 it was a forum for a growing chorus of intellectuals 
demanding greater freedom. The gradual opening-up of thought and the struggle, at first 
solitary but later collective, to claim rights gave that generation of intellectuals a meaning 
and purpose, which perhaps seems harder for those whose formative intellectual years 
were shaped by dissent to find in today’s economically well-off, comparatively free 
Taiwan. 
The concern for preserving buildings and memorializing institutions that 
symbolize Taiwan’s postwar era can be viewed in relation to a complex, triangular 
relationship that exists in political discourse on Taiwan between three entities: the idea of 
“Taiwan” itself, the Guomindang-led state, and the specter of the People’s Republic of 
China. Throughout the martial law period, and particularly since the end of that period, 
each of these entities has had a constantly shifting relationship to the others in discourse.  
In the 1950s, the discourse fomented by the Guomindang sought to align its nation 
                                                
23 Wan-lin Zhang, “Wen Ren, Shui An, Yu Jizhou-an: Xunsuo Taibei Chengnan Wenxue 
Zuji (文人，水岸，與紀州庵：尋索台北城南文學足跡),” 文訊 (Wenhsun) (September 
2011). 
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diametrically against the PRC and to suppress “Taiwan.”  At the end of martial law, the 
Guomindang lost its overwhelming power, and those with an alternative view of what 
Taiwan was attained some power within the Guomindang’s Republic of China, even 
holding the presidency for a considerable period.  During the initial development of the 
Kishuan preservation movement, the independence-minded Democratic People’s Party 
held the executive reigns of power, and there was considerable anxiety about the PRC’s 
reaction to moves toward independence and its ability to control Taiwan.    Today, the 
discourse of the Ma Ying-jeou era is concerned with the strengthening ties between the 
ROC—which, after an interval of divided government, has once again become an entity 
more clearly aligned with the Guomindang—and the PRC; the position of “Taiwan” as a 
not-simply-Chinese entity, while not suppressed, continues to be highly ambiguous but 
can be set against both PRC and the Guomindang government.  Amid the shifting sands 
of this kind of triangular discourse, historic sites like Kishu An are used by supporters of 
one side or another to try to establish and shape their own position.  In particular, the 
preservation of Kishu An has reflected the position of “Taiwan” advocates that privileges 
Taiwan as a unique entity with a history of its own that admits of both Japanese and 
Chinese influences, and perhaps even favors the Japanese side. 
  Earlier I identified that one of the losses around which the Kishu An community 
is built is the loss of the 1990s transition period, when Taiwan seemed to be moving in a 
different direction from the Chinese nationalism of the PRC.  The concern about this 
potential loss is based partly in the recent rapprochement between the Ma Ying-jeou 
administration and the Communist Party of China, and partly on the retention of ROC’s 
official “one China” position that presumes eventual reunification.  It is also rooted in the 
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fear of and contempt for the PRC that the Guomindang itself stoked over much of its rule, 
fears which were stirred up in no small measure to try to distinguish itself from the PRC. 
Feelings toward the PRC can be visceral among Taiwanese: Leo Ching, raised in Taiwan 
by a Taiwanese mother and a father who fled from the mainland after World War II, has 
written of his “indescribable fear” as a 10-year-old upon seeing a group of mainland 
Chinese wearing Mao suits.24  These attitudes have persisted into the post-martial law 
period.  Petrus Liu writes of how contemporary bestselling nonfiction works in Taiwan 
portray the PRC as subhuman, “lacking education, cultural refinement, and civilized 
manners.” By contrast, Taiwan is depicted in these works as having attained refinement 
due to its contact with Western cultures.25  The PRC, cast as a distorted doppelganger of 
the ROC, is simultaneously conceived as a Chinese polity that has been coarsened by 
Communism and as one that has not been sufficiently leavened by exposure to Western 
enlightenment.  Therefore, by undertaking cultural actions such as preserving and 
celebrating historic buildings and a literary past, even if they were constructed by and in 
the image of an erstwhile enemy (the Japanese), Taiwanese can differentiate themselves 
from the PRC.  Further, if it is partly foreign influences that make Taiwan superior to the 
PRC, then by claiming a multiethnic identity, Taiwanese can further separate themselves 
from the PRC. 
The anticommunist discourse through which the Guomindang had cast the PRC as 
the enemy, as frightening, and as less than human also simultaneously relies on and seeks 
to conceal the fact that the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, and hence the 
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two parties’ states, have shared roots.  Sun Yat-sen promoted socialism if not Marxism, 
and he was inspired by the Bolsheviks’ success in overthrowing the Russian czarist 
government.26  In the 1920s the Guomindang would collaborate militarily with both the 
Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union, and Chiang Kai-shek consented to send his 
own son Chiang Ching-kuo to the Soviet Union for training.  The son, who despite 
briefly renouncing his father as a counterrevolutionary while he was in school in Moscow 
in the 1920s, would go on to hold high positions in the military and the civil government 
and would become president of the ROC upon the death of his father in 1975.  Chiang 
Ching-kuo continued to read Marxist literature and make use of his Marxist education as 
a military leader through the 1940s, leading to rumors in Taiwan that he was a secret 
Communist.27  Thus, beneath the surface of the Guomindang’s strident anti-Communism 
is the reality that its greatest leaders’ identities to the end of the martial law period 
included Communist DNA.  The rapprochement between the current government of 
Guomindang leader Ma and the Chinese Communist rulers on the mainland seems to 
echo and reinforce these much earlier ties and common origin that bind the PRC and the 
ROC together.  As if to underscore the threat of PRC-ROC reconciliation, in the context 
of the new economic and political ties established between the PRC and the ROC, such as 
the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and cross-strait 
visits by party leaders, more and more ROC residents are identifying in surveys as 
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ethnically Taiwanese, rather than Chinese.28  The rapprochement between the PRC and 
the ROC governments has thus proceeded while the third side of the triangle, that of 
“Taiwan,” has continued to assert itself.  Thus, locally preserved historic sites such as 
Kishu An Forest of Literature, which privilege non-ROC and non-Chinese histories, 
stand within the “Taiwan” side of this triangular relationship against both the ROC and 
the PRC.  The preservation of such sites as symbols of the past asserts that no matter the 
reconciliation between the PRC and ROC sides of the triangular relationship, the 
“Taiwan” side remains standing, independent in its view of history, and able to continue 
to shape its conception of its own identity. 
Tensions Between National Identity and Local History in the Historic 
Preservation of the Kishu An 
Describing the 1990s search for a new Taiwanese identity, Shih-San Henry Tsai 
terms Lee Teng-Hui’s articulation of this identity as “state nationalism,” which he sets 
against the “ethnic nationalism” that supposedly defines the Chinese nation as conceived 
by the PRC and the pre-Lee ROC governments.  This “state nationalism,” according to 
Tsai, makes room for multiple ethnicities, including aboriginals, ethnic Chinese who 
trace their ancestry on Taiwan back centuries, and the post-World War II arrivals from 
the mainland.  Its identification with President Lee suggests that it even makes room for 
those who identify in some way as Japanese, as Lee himself admitted to doing after his 
retirement.29  If nationalism on Taiwan is now defined as “state nationalism” that 
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conceives of Taiwan as a place within the larger western Pacific basin, rather than a place 
within China, opens the door to the possibility of saving historic sites that reflect a non-
Chinese, even Japanese heritage, yet still doing so within the framework of nationalism. 
Needless to say, this notion of a “state nationalist” discourse is a fragile one, as it 
implies a certain kind of essentialism: that the nation of Taiwan consists of a fixed set of 
ethnicities and historic identities, and no more.  In its articulation by President Lee, it is 
implied that the identity was, by the 1990s, pre-existing, dating at least to the late 
Japanese occupation era (not coincidentally, Lee’s formative years), but that it had been 
suppressed by the pro-Chinese Guomindang and was revealed after Taiwan’s political 
liberalization. Considering possible readings of a World War II-era Taiwanese novel, The 
Orphan of Asia, Leo Ching calls into question the very need to situate a debate over fixed 
identities at the center of inquiry. Rather than examining the novel as a text that treats 
Taiwan as a nation that is struggling to find a fixed place within multiple identities, Ching 
seeks to describe the novel as a site of a conscious movement in which identity is 
continually being formed as the protagonist moves through space and time.30  If identities 
are conceived as fluid and self-conscious rather than fixed and pre-bounded, then Lee’s 
state nationalism, like the pro-China essentialism that preceded it, seems less a fixed 
identity than a moment in time when a particular notion of Taiwan became self-
crystallized.   The actions of invoking nationalism to preserving historical sites can then 
be regarded as not only a response to a particular notion of national identity, but also as 
an act that seeks to capture, preserve and assert an identity at a particular moment, and, 
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going forward, to bend the future national identity in the direction of this crystallized 
earlier identity. 
 The research report on Kishuan prepared by National Taiwan University for the 
city government hints at such a possibility, in its suggestion that the site, though 
appearing “jumbled and chaotic,” in the words of the report, actually manifests a 
succession of historical time periods, thereby exhibiting a certain historical dynamism 
that is not bound to one particular time period.31  Nonetheless, the reconstruction plans 
are primarily concerned with restoring the appearance of the Japanese period, as is 
apparent from the planning principles the report outlines.  Upon an examination of these 
principles, three major concerns emerge: first, to restore both the architecture and the use 
of the remains of the Japanese building; second, to match the various exterior renovations 
and restorations with the site’s overall appearance; and third, to harmonize reconstruction 
with the needs of the proposed reuse. As of 2005, when the reconstruction plan was 
prepared, the Japanese building was in a very dilapidated condition, and major portions 
of it had been lost to fires; further, postwar additions had been constructed adjoining its 
east and south sides.  For the reconstruction, it was proposed to restore those portions of 
the Japanese building that remained standing, but not to rebuild the portions that had 
already been destroyed.  The main body of the remaining Japanese building would 
remain divided into a series of tatami-style rooms that would be used for activities. One 
of the postwar additions would be retained because, according to the report, the space in 
the remaining Japanese building was inadequate to perform the functions demanded by 
the reuse of the site; a further advantage of retaining them would be to manifest a 
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dynamic sense of time concerning the history of the site.  The outdoor portions of the site, 
meanwhile, were to be restored in a way that matched the appearance of the original 
Kishu An, while also in harmony with the needs of the adaptive reuse of the site.  The 
plan even spoke of restoring the pond around which the site’s banyan trees grew up, 
while acknowledging that additional excavation would be needed to determine its exact 
location.  In sum, the proposal called for a selective reconstruction of the site, focusing 
primarily on reusing the Japanese rooms in the remaining building, maintaining the site’s 
Japanese-style appearance, and providing necessary additional space for support purposes.   
Somewhat jarringly in a report concerned principally with restoring Japanese 
architecture, the word guangfu (光復), roughly “shining restoration” or “shining 
recovery,” is used repeatedly in report to refer to the historical transfer of Taiwan from 
Japanese rule to Republic of China rule; specifically, those portions of the building added 
after the war are referred to as guangfu hou jianwu (光復後增建物), or “post-guangfu 
additions.”  The term guangfu, though perhaps meant in a neutral sense in the report, is 
obviously loaded with Chinese nationalist meaning.32  Its description of the transfer as a 
“restoration” or “recovery” can be questioned, as the Republic of China—the entity that 
purportedly recovered Taiwan—did not yet exist when Taiwan was ceded to Japan, and, 
strictly speaking, during nearly the entire prior period of Taiwan’s settlement by the 
Chinese, the island was governed by the Manchu Qing empire.33  Yet the report otherwise 
is largely devoid of nationalist rhetoric.  It is concerned instead with a very local history: 
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first, the position of the original building itself within the cityscape of Taipei as a 
Japanese nightclub, and moreover, its subsequent postwar meaning within the context of 
the surrounding neighborhood as a residence and a green oasis.  It makes clear that the 
site was valued not only for its architecture, but also for its large banyan trees which had 
grown up in what had been a Japanese garden, and the meaning of those trees to 
neighborhood residents.34  The emphasis that the report places on local history, while also 
at least paying lip service to the nationalist concerns, exemplifies a tension between 
nationalism and localism that pervades the historic preservation movement throughout 
the world.  This tension is perhaps heightened in Taiwan owing to the inherently 
precarious position of the national government on the island, not to mention the need for 
historic preservationists to avoid ruffling strong sentiments on any side of the identity 
question as they seek public and private support.   
The report thus mentions the historical importance of the area surrounding Kishu 
An to Taiwanese literature (台灣文學), but emphasizes the importance of preserving a 
Japanese style in the reconstruction.  In doing so, it reinforces the divide that has emerged 
in the planning and programming of Kishu An Forest of Literature: while the significant 
cultural reasons for preservation, relating to postwar literature and the spaces of opening-
up and dissent, are acknowledged (and indeed accounted for in the ongoing cultural 
programming of the site), the physical reconstruction will take on a self-consciously 
Japanese form and appearance. With respect to the literary scene, most of the emphasis in 
the report and in other documentation about the site concentrates on the neighborhood, or 
at most the city.  Localism generally prevails. 
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Historic preservation movements globally contain strains of both nationalism and 
localism, but there has been a tendency for the discourse of nationalism to predominate, 
in part because the major sources of funding for preservation, whether from government 
or private philanthropy, tend to be nationalist in orientation.  Tracing the roots of the 
historic preservation movement in Western societies, Christine Boyer identifies a set of 
lithographs of 3,000 historic and scenic sites in nine provinces of France prepared as 
travel guides in the early 1800s as an early stirring of the historic preservation movement 
in that country; this project, she says, sparked the national government to commission 
bureaucracies to oversee the preservation of historic monuments throughout the French 
nation in the 1830s.35  What started as a collection of local images quickly took on 
nationalist overtones.  But preservation of more prosaic urban sites lagged; even in 
France, writers and photographers who valued urban scenes could do little more than 
record the vanishing as Haussmann’s boulevards tore through the medieval fabric of Paris 
in the middle of the 19th century. Indeed, the incorporation of city architecture, other 
than elite monuments such as palaces, cathedrals and city halls, into the general historic 
preservation movement is a more recent phenomenon, generally traced to an upwelling of 
locally based sentiment against modernist attempts to replace the local and historic in big 
cities with generic, globalized cityscapes. One historical event that has come to 
symbolize this rise in the United States is the unsuccessful uprising by civic reformers 
and architects against the 1960s demolition of Penn Station in New York City; these 
protests and the implementation of landmark laws that closely followed them in New 
York and elsewhere were the culmination of a long battle within elite communities to 
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entrench historic preservation in the institutional apparatus of city governments.36  It is 
not a coincidence that in the United States, this movement finally won its breakthrough 
successes in the 1960s and 1970s, a time when many midcentury cultural norms were 
being questioned by those at all strata of society.  Yet this 20th-century urban movement 
has largely merged with the older, more patrician movement to preserve historic 
monuments and scenic sites (if it was ever truly separate); organizations which arose 
earlier, such as the National Trust for Historic Preservation, are now equally concerned 
with both types of sites, and declare both to be of national significance.37 In doing so, the 
urban preservationists have also adopted, or at least acquiesced to, the nationalist rhetoric 
of the historic preservation movement.  
If these nationalist values of preservation are deemed important in preservation 
communities within Western states that have very strong national identities and firm 
boundaries, then it is perhaps not surprising that they would be fervently embraced in 
states that are trying mightily to secure their national identities and establish such 
boundaries—all the more so in a state as insecure as the ROC.  In Taiwan, the 
Guomindang government first began to embrace historic preservation in the early 1980s 
with the establishment of the Cultural Assets Protection Law and  the establishment of 
the Council for Cultural Affairs of the Executive Yuan.  This organization conceived of 
historic preservation as protecting the national heritage for the purpose of encouraging 
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love of country, which it interpreted as meaning those aspects of Taiwan’s history that 
reflected Taiwan as a component of the nation of China.  Aspects of Taiwanese history 
that did not align with this view, such as aboriginal historical sites or buildings left 
behind from the Japanese colonial occupation, were disregarded.38  But in the 1990s, after 
martial law was lifted and those who favored local history promoted the idea that 
Taiwanese were an independent people, encouraged by then-president Lee Teng-hui, a 
search for historic sites that could reflect a newly conceived Taiwanese national heritage 
began.39  But as the Kishu An restoration documents suggests, openly identifying a 
Taiwanese nation may not be something that can be done explicitly in a report on a 
historic site funded by the city government.   
And yet, given the emphasis on the local, the mixed, and the plural of the 1990s 
Taiwan nationalist movement, and the relative absence of nationalist rhetoric in the report, 
perhaps it could be said that the intensely localist discourse that characterizes the Kishu 
An report implies a certain affinity for this movement.  At the same time, the preservation 
movement relies on the Japanese era to mediate between hyper-local history and 
“Taiwan.”  Japanesness, in this sense, has become a stand-in for notions of an 
independent Taiwanese identity that cannot be articulated directly; because the Japanese 
occupation era is now far removed in history and Japan, the nation-state, is in no position 
to assert any claim over the island, it has become safe to talk about Japaneseness on 
Taiwan, whereas the conflict between partisans of “Taiwan” as having an independent 
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identity and those of the One China perspective is still very much ongoing.  So we are left 
with a report that justifies the significance of the site in terms of local history while 
arguing for the preservation of a style that is identified over and over as national—that of 
the Japanese nation.  
Coming to Terms with the Japanese Legacy: An Opening for a 
Neighborhood Preservation Agenda 
The city government report’s sidestepping of the nationalism question is 
suggestive the need of Kishu An Forest of Literature and its advocates to appeal to as 
wide a range of constituencies as possible; like other historic sites, it has had to receive 
support and funding both in the initial preservation stage and to ensure its continued 
maintenance and protection.  In a city where land is at a premium, historic buildings must 
avoid becoming so-called wenziguan (“mosquito halls”)—a term that has emerged to 
describe structures preserved for historic reasons but for which no profitable use has been 
found.40  The preservation of Kishu An and other similar Japanese historic sites connects 
to and is supported by broader agendas of neighborhood quality of life whose advocates 
do not necessarily concern themselves directly with the issues of identity that pervade 
historical discourse in Taiwan, but nevertheless have taken advantage of the revaluing of 
Japanese historical sites to advance particular visions of neighborhood and civic life. 
Any intervention in the physical environment of Taipei or most other places on 
Taiwan must come to terms with the overwhelming Japanese legacy.  The Japanese 
footprint looms large in Taiwan’s physical development: the layout of the cities, the 
highway network, the railway network, and the system of ports were all planned and 
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implemented during Japanese rule.41  The planning of Taipei’s system of boulevards was 
substantially the work of the Japanese civil administration. Thus, the Japanese nature of 
Taiwan’s constructed environment is apparent in the physical forms that its residents 
inhabit.  There was an attempt to “sinify” the island after World War II, and although 
Taipei and Taiwan’s other cities were transformed in the postwar years, the form the 
reconstruction took was more the result of expediency than of any attempt at sinification.  
The physical patterns established during the colonial period and those that survived from 
earlier times remained in place. The city plan of Taipei was updated building on rather 
than completely disregarding the colonial plans; for example, plans for future parks made 
under the Japanese administration were being realized as late as the 1990s.42  Streets were 
renamed to signify places in China, but Japanese government buildings, including the 
most prominent public building in Taipei, the Presidential Palace, were simply 
repurposed rather than destroyed, as in Korea. The effect overall was a semantic rather 
than a physical sinification.  The failure to wipe out the physical traces of the Japanese 
occupation left plenty of extant Japanese sites available for re-evaluation after the martial 
law period ended. 
During the 1990s transition period, architects and planners began to take an 
interest in certain older buildings that were constructed during the Japanese era. These 
buildings are often described in Taiwan as “Japanese style,” which is a confusing term 
because it refers to a range of building types, not all of which appear to the untrained eye 
to be designed in a Japanese mode.  First, many, though not all, of the public buildings in 
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Taiwan dating to the occupation era were constructed in a so-called hybrid style which 
incorporates both Japanese and Western elements; effectively, this was a style that 
asserted the Japanese nation while often utilizing Western forms.43  Perhaps the most 
prominent hybrid building is the Presidential Palace, the large scale and form of which 
are related to Western prototypes, but which incorporates many Japanese elements in the 
design, including the shape of the building when viewed from the air; like its counterpart 
in Korea, the form of the building is in the shape of the character which symbolizes Japan 
in both Japanese and Chinese.  Another well-known example of such building is Wude 
Hall in Tainan, which was a martial-arts academy.  Although at a casual glance, the 
Presidential Palace may appear more “Western” and Wude Hall more “Japanese,” both 
share design elements in common which mark them as Japanese-western hybrids—for 
example, the very prominent, rounded portico element centered above the main entry on 
Wude Hall is echoed in a similarly shaped element just below the central tower on the 
Presidential Palace. Japanese-era buildings in older districts of Taipei which have lately 
been preserved as tourist attractions such as Dihua Street (迪化街) also display exterior 
embellishments of this style, while their basic form is that of modern, Western-style 
storefront commercial building.44 The hybrid buildings may be contrasted with other 
Japanese-era public buildings such as the National Taiwan Museum, which were 
designed in a purely Western mode.45 
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In addition to the public buildings and commercial buildings which are in 
Japanese hybrid styles or explictly in Western styles, Taiwan’s architectural heritage 
dating to the occupation era includes many smaller, residential buildings that are less 
identifiably Western in form, though, like the more prominent hybridized public 
architecture, they do include Western elements; the interiors are sometimes a mix of 
Japanese tatami and Western formal rooms. Nonetheless, to most casual observers they 
likely appear thoroughly Japanese, and they were designed to mirror to contemporary 
domestic architecture in Japan, which was quite different in design from the traditional 
Chinese residential architecture that had previously dominated Taiwan. 46  In Taipei, 
these buildings were constructed throughout the areas of the city in which Japanese lived.  
They are typically one story in height, though larger examples exist; are detached from 
surrounding buildings, have gardens on all sides, except where the building line is 
adjacent to a street or alley; and are located behind high privacy walls. Kishu An is a 
somewhat unusual member of this class, being a commercial building that was 
constructed in the domestic style.  This villa-style architecture still provides some Taipei 
blocks a unique flavor, distinguishing them from the clusters of bulky five-story 
apartment buildings that characterize much of the city’s postwar development.  At the 
same time, many of these homes have been neglected since World War II and are in 
varying states of disrepair.  Considering Taipei’s shortage of space, that the buildings 
have not yet all been demolished and replaced by larger, modern buildings is a testament 
to the byzantine politics of land ownership in postwar Taipei, where various government 
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agencies laid claim to the buildings expropriated from the Japanese at the end of the war 
and use of them as housing was granted to civil servants and pensioners.  It was not until 
recent years that the Republic of China government began to consolidate its holdings into 
a single agency, which has sought to sell many of these properties for real estate 
development.47  Kishu An, having been made a dormitory in the 1950s for government 
workers, was among the buildings whose demolition was delayed by wrangling over land 
ownership. 
While the hybrid-style buildings looked plausibly European and as such could 
attract preservation interest earlier on by dint of their association with Western culture, 
many of the domestic buildings that were more obviously Japanese in style had to await 
the 1990s for reevaluation. Conveniently, these Japanese-style residences also had 
qualities that were evaluated favorably by neighborhood activists, architects and planners 
seeking to mitigate the increasing building density of the city of Taipei.  Since World 
War II, the rapid population increase in the city has resulted in the construction of midrise 
apartment buildings throughout areas that were formerly relatively low in scale and 
density.  More recently, these apartments have begun to be supplanted by even taller 
buildings, taking advantage of the demand for housing and concentration of wealth in 
central Taipei.  The new buildings reach skyward, providing views for their occupants 
and maximizing the number of units on site, while sacrificing the ground floor to 
automobile storage.  (Older buildings generally had stores and workshops at ground level.) 
For activists and architects, retaining Japanese domestic buildings is a way to retain the 
more traditional, human-scaled street scenes they favor.  A movement of architects and 
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planners arose in the 1990s to preserve these those buildings that they identified as 
“Japanese style”; this movement succeeded in having a guide to such dwellings published 
by the City of Taipei Cultural Affairs Bureau but considers its overall efforts to save the 
housing as only marginally successful.48   
What the activists emphasize about the importance of saving the older Japanese 
dwellings is that those sites had the benefit of providing open space, trees and gardens on 
private property (see figure 5), whereas postwar construction generally covered the entire 
lot with a building, squeezing out any possibility for vegetation.  As Taiwan, especially 
the area of Taipei between NTU and NTNU, has become wealthy, greater attention has 
been paid to the urban landscape, and today it is not uncommon to find articles in 
Taiwanese magazines extolling these historic Japanese dwellings as providing green 
oases in the cityscape.49 In the case of Kishu An in particular, crucial in galvanizing the 
residents of the surrounding area to activism on behalf of saving the site was a city 
proposal to remove the tall banyan trees on the site in order to construct a neighborhood 
parking lot.50 The importance of saving the trees themselves to the whole preservation 
effort is reflected in the name of both the initial preservation organization, the Tong’an 
Forest of Culture Booster Association, and in the name of the new cultural center, the 
Kishu An Forest of Literature.  Trees are crucial to preservation movements involving 
other such sites, as well.  For instance, a cycle-tour brochure of Japanese architectural 
sites produced by the Taipei City Cultural Bureau with the cooperation of preservation 
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activists gives near-equal billing to the houses and the trees, as exemplified in its title, 
“鐵騎遊台北：尋木屋，訪大樹，再現老台北”  (“Tour Taipei by bicycle: Search for 
wooden houses, visit tall trees, recreate old Taipei”).  Further emphasizing the connection 
to trees, the title also plays up the “wooden” aspect of the houses’ building materials, 
while deemphasizing their Japanese heritage.51  (The few lines of English text on the 
cover of this brochure are less poetically circumspect, referring openly to the buildings as 
“Japanese colonial houses.”)  For environmentally-minded residents and activists, then, 
the work of preservation groups such as the Taipei Chengnan Riverbank Literary Society 
attached a cultural value to the site which thereby provided a method to preserve a green 
space that might otherwise have been destroyed. It is fitting, then, that some of the 
funding for the preservation and planning movement was provided by a philanthropy 
initiative of a real estate firm, which would no doubt be aware of the importance of green 
space to neighboring property values.52   
It is important to recognize that the reevaluation of the Japanese period in 
Taiwan’s history that took place in the 1990s provided an opening for those who were 
concerned about the built environment to make this argument for preservation, and the 
ties that such sites have developed to popular culture has provided a way for them to 
sustain themselves.  It would probably not have been possible to openly make the case for 
preserving Japanese houses and structures such as Kishuan without the changes that 
occurred in attitudes toward the Japanese occupation generally.  However, the general 
acceptance of the Japanese era as a legitimate and valuable part of local history has come 
                                                
51 “Tieji You Taibei.” 
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in part because Japan is removed enough from present-day political concerns so as to no 
longer be threatening; further, it gives Taiwan something of a national style without 
wearing the name.  The attention paid to Japanese architecture in recent years makes for a 
striking contrast with early postwar development, associated entirely with the 
Guomindang era, that also has some of the human-scaled qualities that advocates value 
(and, unlike the Japanese buildings, is generally not hidden behind walls) but has had 
more difficulty finding and maintaining constituencies of support. I discuss this contrast 
further in the conclusion to this paper. 
Conclusion: Japanophilia, Taiwanophilia?  Felt and Unfelt Losses in 
the Postwar Landscape 
All historic reconstruction is an act of simulation, of making the nonreal appear 
real by the act of creating a simulation of some time in the past and asserting that that 
simulation is real.  Christine Boyer identifies this process as analogous to that of theatre, 
noting that architecture is “a kind of artificial memory device” for spectators of the urban 
scene.53  Indeed, these simulations are particularly powerful as symbols when they take 
the form of architecture because their solidity and occupation of a discrete chunk of 
land—“real estate”—at once heightens the illusion of reality and also limits imagination 
by making it difficult for the spectator to conceive any other possible realization on the 
site. As a piece of the built environment, the reconstruction of the Kishu An is still one 
step removed from this level of simulation, in that it has not yet been completed.  But 
Kishu An Forest of Literature, the cultural center, already excavates the past to present 
for retrospective spectatorship two contiguous eras of comparative struggle on the island: 
                                                
53 Boyer, The city of collective memory, 74. 
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the latter part of the Japanese occupation era, and the 1950s-1970s era of Guomindang 
control at the height of the Cold War.  Yet while the latter era more richly informs the 
preservationists’ understanding of their actions in restoring the site and building a cultural 
center, the Japanese era is clearly favored in the Kishu An’s presentation of itself to the 
broader public. It would probably not have been possible to openly make the case for 
preserving Japanese houses and structures such as Kishu An without the changes that 
occurred in attitudes toward the Japanese occupation generally.  Since 2008, the 
Guomindang has retaken the reigns of government, and has attempted to institute more 
China-centric education into the school curriculum; this move has sparked speculation 
that the pendulum may swing back toward sinicization and away from the positive views 
of the Japanese occupation era.54 But with the movement to preserve Kishu An and other 
such sites now firmly ensconced in neighborhood activism and, more broadly, these sites 
having taken their place in Taiwan’s and Taipei’s popular culture, the likelihood of such 
a return seems questionable. The loss of the Japanese past is a loss that is firmly felt by a 
wide spectrum of society that remains eager to consume Japanese cultural products. 
Tellingly, it is this loss of and longing for Japan that Kishu An Forest of 
Literature and its reconstruction plans exploit to try to build a broader public constituency.  
The “Japanophilia” phenomenon in Taiwan since the 1990s has been much remarked 
upon; in the sphere of popular culture, Japanese entertainment has become wildly 
                                                
54 Yoshihisa Amae, “Pro-colonial or Postcolonial? Appropriation of Japanese Colonial 
Heritage in Present-day Taiwan,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 40, no. 1 (January 
2011): 19–62. 
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popular.55  The Japanophilia has also touched the more elite spheres of activity, not only 
through preservation of such buildings as Kishu An, but also through preservation 
movements concerned with other, less functional artifacts of Japanese rule such as Shinto 
shrines; further, native cultural products also imitate the Japanese style.56   Shuling 
Huang even identifies Taiwanese television programs that were filmed in Japanese-style 
buildings in Taiwan to establish a Japanese look.57  Kishu An Forest of Literature reveals 
evidence of “Japanophilia” materially not only through the planned restoration of the 
original Japanese building, but through the teahouse in the newly constructed cultural 
center and a replica of the original building which is given pride of place in the lobby of 
the center. At present, the old building is in a state of utter disrepair, hidden at ground 
level by a tall stockade fence and from above by a protective metal shed, and the gates 
cannot be unlocked without special permission from the Kishu An Forest of Literature 
administrators (see figure 6). By hiding the building away, the administrators encourage 
the visitor to imagine what it might be like based on the exhibits and consumption 
opportunities offered in the new building. 
The teahouse operated within the new building admittedly straddles a somewhat 
ambiguous position. It offers Taiwanese tea and the sort of food and drink that is popular 
in Taipei’s many cafes (themselves a blend of Japanese, Western and Chinese influences), 
including some items that are readily identified as Japanese (for example, certain fish side 
dishes), but also other items that are emphatically not considered Japanese in the public 
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mind (such as beef noodle soup).  Yet the spirit of an emphatically Japanese teahouse 
elsewhere in Taipei is undeniably echoed in the Kishu An teahouse: the Wistaria Tea 
House mentioned earlier, which occupies the first Japanese domestic building to be 
officially declared a landmark by the city government in the 1990s.  The Wistaria, which 
offers tea in a traditional Japanese tatami setting, has been identified since the early 
1980s with Taipei’s literary and cultural scenes. Following in the example set by the 
Wistaria, Kishu An’s more casual and contemporary teahouse is part and parcel of its 
attempt to establish literary bona fides. If the Japanese building is restored according to 
the plans set forth in 2005, then the similarity to the Wistaria will be even more explicit, 
as the Kishu An will have tatami spaces available where food and drink can be served, 
just as the Wistaria has.  Fittingly, if the plans are followed, the food-preparation and 
other back-of-house operations will be situated within the remaining postwar martial-law 
period additions to the Kishu An building. 
The current site reveals evidence of “Japanophilia” even more conspicuously 
through a newly constructed model of a Japanese residence the new cultural center 
displays in its lobby (see figure 7).  Given pride of place on the main floor of the new 
building is a model of the dwelling described in Family Catastrophe, created by a student 
at National Taiwan University.58  This model shows an unambiguously one-story wooden 
Japanese dwelling, incorporating characteristic Japanese features such as windows with 
multiple screens and an entry threshold that requires one to step up in order to enter.59 
Although the original dwelling that inspired the model was located within a larger 
building that was originally a nightclub, the model is depicted as a single dwelling in a 
                                                
58 John K. C. Liu, National Taiwan University, interview by author. 
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detached building, surrounded by stones, plastic flowers and bonsai, suggesting rurality.   
Rather than being hidden behind a tall wall characteristic of the Japanese-style dwellings 
in Taipei, the model is screened along the edge of its “site” by a rough bamboo fence 
with large gaps between the slats.   This depiction matches the description of the house in 
Wang Wenxing’s Family Catastrophe, suggesting an attempt on the part of the cultural 
center to identify itself with the novel as much as with than the actual building on its site, 
which is much larger and structurally of concrete construction.  In a way, this 
manifestation of the novel’s depiction of the building further heightens the Japaneseness 
of the hoped-for reconstruction, because it conforms to the archetype of an isolated 
Japanese house, one story, surrounded by vegetation, and constructed of wood, rather 
than the more complicated actual Kishu An which, after all, was a much larger building 
and a nightclub, albeit in a scenic setting (see figure 8). The preservation of Kishu An as 
a historic site has allowed this particular manifestation of Japaneseness, always present in 
Taiwan’s self-conception as witnessed in such works as Family Catastrophe, to assert 
itself in physical form.  One imagines that future visitors will be able to walk around the 
outside of the restored Kishu An—treading on the original Japanese-era stepping-stones, 
no less, according to the city government plans—and imagine themselves standing in that 
yard—their feet firmly in Taiwan, and yet also in Japan. 
If the place of the Japanese era in Taiwan’s self-conception now seems to have 
found relative stability and security, that of the postwar martial-law era has not.  Aspects 
of the martial-law era have been lionized by economists and Guomindang partisans, 
condemned as unjust and repressive by intellectuals and Taiwanese small-n nationalists, 
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and dismissed by scholars for their supposed visual blight.60  Yet Kishu An is 
undoubtedly a place not only of nostalgia for the occupation era but also, through its 
commemoration of the literary heritage, for the postwar, martial-law period.  As a place-
based movement that commemorates not only the individual site of the Kishu An, but 
also the publishing legacy of the broader neighborhood, it is also implicitly praising the 
postwar built environment as creating spaces where a subtle form of resistance could 
develop.  Ironically, it is this underappreciated Taipei urban fabric, with a space for a 
workshop or storefront under every three- or five-story apartment building, that is under 
threat in the contemporary city, with the insertion of luxury, fortress-style apartment 
buildings which, like many of the Japanese-style dwellings, lurk behind blank walls, but 
do not provide much in the way of trees and greenery to soften their impact (see figure 9).  
Apart from unique environments such as the veteran’s housing of Treasure Hill, the 
potential loss of this fabric has so far not attracted significant attention from planners or 
activists, much less society at large, perhaps because it remains so ubiquitous.61  An as-
yet unanswered question is whether it will ever be possible for the postwar urban fabric 
that gave rise to spaces of uniquely Taiwanese dissent to come to be valued by as many 
constituencies as Japanese structures such as the Kishu An.  The association of the 
postwar fabric with a regime that many still find threatening suggests that it may be 
difficult to develop the necessary constituencies for such a “Taiwanophilia” preservation 
movement. 
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Fig. 1: Part of the remains of the 
Kishu An building beneath its 
protective metal shed. The visible 
portion of the building beneath 
the shed is a postwar addition. 
Photograph by author. 
Fig. 2: Kishu An Forest of 
Literature’s constituencies and 















Fig. 3: The new Kishu An Forest 
of Literature which opened in 
2011. The characters for “Kishu 
An,” a Japanese word, are printed 
in much larger type on the sign 
than those for “Forest of 
Literature.” Photograph by 
author. 
Fig. 4: Directional sign 
identifying the Kishu An Forest 
of Literature as  simply “Kishu 
An.”  The English emphasizes the 
green space with the word “Park,” 











Fig. 6: The condition of the 
Japanese-style Kishu An building 
in summer 2012.   This view of 
the interior is not accessible to 
most visitors to the site, and it is 
impossible to get an overview of 
the remaining building which is 
surrounded by the trees and the 
stockade fence. Photograph by 
author. 
Fig. 5: The low-rise, vegetated 
cityscape of remaining areas of 
“Japanese-style” houses in Taipei. 








Fig. 7: The Kishu An Forest of 
Literature’s model of Kishu An as 
based on the description in 
Family Catastrophe. Photograph 
by author. 
Fig. 8: The main wing of the 
actual Kishu An, likely in the 
1990s, before the front portion of 
the building was lost to fire.  
Reproduced on an exhibition 
board in the Kishu An Forest of 
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